Abstract-Scientific research achievements play a positive role in the promotion of social development. Scholarly big data include scholars' scientific research, experimental data, and their own identity information. The security of scholarly big data relates to the authors' reputation and the copyright of their works. This paper proposes a trusted third-party-aided searchable and verifiable data protection scheme that utilizes cloud computing technology. For a better description of the the protocol, we first present a user-differentiated system model and a cube data storage structure. On the basis of the novel system model and data structure, the scheme helps the users review the integrity of their uploaded or downloaded data at any time and search the online scholarly data with encrypted keywords. The security analysis and performance simulation demonstrate that the novel scheme is a secure and efficient scheme for scholarly big data applications.
INTRODUCTION
T HE development of society is inseparable from scientific and technological progress, both of which must rely on theoretical innovation and upgrades. Scientific research from all fields involves all aspects of people's lives. With the continuous development of research in various fields and the emergence of new fields, the achievements of various fields are becoming increasingly abundant. There are many reasons for the increase of scholarly data, including an increase in the number of scholars, the complexity of the networks of scholars, the diversification of magazines and journals, the growing readership and the continuous expansion of professional fields. People care about the development of scholarly big data because these data are related to the quality of life in the coming decades or even hundreds of years [1] , [2] .
The formation of scholarly big data is actually the result of the great development of scientific theory research [3] . Scholarly big data include research scholars' personal information, papers, experimental data sets, and results. These data may include information regarding the authors' privacy and social relationships, copyright and right of authorship, and experimental data related to personal privacy, such as medical data [4] , [5] . These data are complex and extremely important. If the coauthor of an academic achievement is likely to be tampered with, the author's academic reputation may be affected. If malicious users are using legitimate users' identities to upload data to the system, the researchers' results may be tampered with or replaced. The keywords with which users search on academic sites may reveal the authors' latest ideas or the readers' private information. For example, a search for a disease and its associated research dynamics may reveal a reader's physical condition. Therefore, scholarly big data are not only a significant asset for researchers but also an important lifeline for data users. It is thus crucial to develop new approaches for the research, development, and conservation of scholarly big data [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] .
Cloud computing technology is one of the most widely used distributed computing technologies [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] . The powerful computing capability of cloud computing technology and the undeniable capacity of cloud storage have received widespread attention. Cloud computing and cloud storage technologies are widely used in many fields, such as medical systems, transportation systems, smart homes, meteorological observation, and water body observation. The large number of research results has laid a theoretical and practical foundation for cloud computing technology to be put into practice. Cloud computing technology is applied in digital image processing [15] , signal processing [16] , [17] , [18] , data mining [19] , natural language processing, network routing [20] , [21] , information security [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] and other fields. Obviously, the continuous development of cloud computing technology provides the possibility for storage of scholarly big data. Cloud computing technology can provide considerable technical support and a platform for scholarly big data [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] . For example, cloud storage enables data to be stored in faster and more convenient data structures for easy searching, additions and deletions. In addition, with the computing power of the cloud, one can effectively verify the integrity of data and prevent wrong data from affecting researchers' experiments and research results. The promotion of cloud computing technology requires efficient schemes to ensure user data security and user privacy. Many researchers have proposed excellent schemes for cloud data security protection [17] , [24] , [27] , [31] , [32] . These schemes focus on protecting cloud storage data from different aspects. The cloud can be utilized to provide secure data storage, fast search services and data integrity verification for scholarly big data [33] . Thus, a cloud-aided secure and efficient scholarly data application system that can reasonably store scholarly data needs to be proposed.
Motivation of this paper: Although there have been many studies on cloud data security protection, currently, there is still no scheme designed specifically for scholarly big data protection. In view of the particularity of scholarly big data, it is necessary to design a suitable protection scheme to achieve better utilization of scientific research achievements. First, an efficient system model must be designed to adapt to the application environment of scholarly big data. Second, due to the discretization of scholarly big data, a novel data structure is required to store these data for convenient encrypted searching. Combined with the characteristics of scholarly big data, the design of a reasonable data storage structure can increase the convenience of their use. Finally, it is very important for valid data readers to have access to both secure searches and the integrity verifications of the search results.
Our contributions
• A trusted third-party-aided user differentiated system model is presented. The system model presented in this paper aims to meet different application requirements from different user identities related to scholarly big data and with different technological implementation processes. Based on the different needs of the users, we divide the users into three identities: authors, editors and readers. Authors can upload their papers, procedures, experimental data and steps, and personal information. Editors can upload information about their journals, calls for papers and special issues and personal information. Valid readers have the right to search for scholarly data on the cloud by using encrypted keywords and require the system to provide an integrity verification of those data. With the help of a trusted third party, the system verifies the identities of these users and helps them search and validate the data.
• A cube data storage structure is utilized. For more convenient storage and searching, we design a new cube data storage structure to store scholarly big data. This structure can not only verify the integrity of different user data separately but also effectively distinguish and store the keywords of different data blocks.
• A searchable and verifiable data protection scheme is proposed. The scheme innovatively implements data integrity verification for secure search results. In other words, the scheme guarantees the integrity of searched data while implementing a secure search. Moreover, the scheme is scalable. Authors and editors can also utilize the proposed scheme to obtain an integrity verification report of their own uploaded data to protect their interests. One of the most important innovations of this paper lies in the participation of keywords in the integrity verification process. This scheme ensures both the secure search function and data integrity and that the keywords are not tampered with.
Related Works
Cloud data secure searches are among the problems faced by users with the continuous development of cloud computing technology. A large number of researchers [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] have devoted efforts to proposing reliable schemes for secure searches of the data in the cloud.
Orencik et al.
[34] present a privacy-preserving searchable scheme for encrypted data using queries with multiple keywords. Additionally, the scheme can hide the search patterns and provide an effective scoring and ranking capability.
Focusing on the range query problem, Jho et al.
[35] present a novel searchable encryption protocol that provides an efficient range query by utilizing symmetric key encryption systems.
Miao et al. [36] present a scheme that can achieve a verifiable conjunctive keywords search of encrypted data without a secure channel. The scheme is proved to ensure data integrity and availability.
Ma et al. [37] propose an efficient certificateless public key encryption scheme with multiple keywords search for industrial Internet of Things. They prove that their protocol is secure and has an acceptable communication cost.
Huang et al.
[38] present a public-key searchable encryption scheme that can solve the issue called inside keyword guessing attacks. They prove that the server in their scheme cannot encrypt a keyword itself or launch an inside keyword guessing attack successfully.
Cloud storage currently plays an important role in society. Cloud data security is one of the key issues of concern. Many excellent schemes [11] , [28] , [39] , [40] , [41] , [42] have been proposed to solve the problems of cloud data integrity verification and security protection.
Jiang et al. [39] design a multi-user system for data integrity auditing on the cloud server. The scheme supports public checking and efficient user revocation as well as the countability and traceability of secure group user revocation.
To address the key exposure problem, Yu et al. [40] propose a cloud storage auditing scheme with key-exposure resilience. In their protocol, key exposure in one time period cannot affect the security of cloud storage auditing in other time periods.
Sookhak et al. [28] propose an algebraic-signature-based efficient remote data auditing technique for a cloud storage system that incurs minimal computational and communication costs. In their paper, a novel data structure called the divide and conquer table is presented to support dynamic data operations such as append, insert, modify, and delete.
To solve security issues such as cloud brokers, Li et al. [41] present a novel cloud service selection verification scheme. Innovative index structures are also proposed in this paper to enable cloud clients to detect misbehavior among cloud brokers during the service selection process.
Yu et al. [42] propose a novel identity-based protocol by making use of key-homomorphic cryptographic primitive to reduce the system complexity. This protocol focuses on two-party key agreement between a trusted third party and the cloud server. A generic group model is utilized to prove the security of their protocol.
The computational and communication overhead of these schemes make it difficult to meet the actual needs. Shen et al. [11] propose an efficient public auditing protocol with global and sampling blockless verification and batch auditing to achieve dynamic data operation. They claim that the computational and communication overhead are reduced substantially with such a structure.
These schemes have made outstanding contributions to the secure search and integrity verification of cloud data. However, a scheme for the secure search and integrity verification of scholarly big data is urgently needed.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminaries for the method presented in this paper, including bilinear pairing and ID-based signature. Section 3 illustrates the user differentiate system model, system components and cube data storage structure. Section 4 presents the security models of the novel scheme. Section 5 presents the proposed scheme in detail. Section 6 describes the security analysis of the proposed scheme. Section 7 presents the performance analysis of the scheme. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some necessary preliminaries utilized in this paper are listed, including bilinear pairing and ID-based signature.
Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups of the same prime order q. Let G 1 be an additive group, and let G 2 be a multiplicative group. A mapping e on (G 1 , G 2 ): G 2 1 → G 2 satisfying the following properties is called a cryptographic bilinear map [43] .
Bilinearity. e (aP, bQ) = e (P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q . This can be expressed in the following manner. For P, Q, R ∈ G 1 , e(P + Q, R) = e(P, R)e(Q, R) and e(P − Q, R) = e(P, R)e(Q, R) −1 . Non-degeneracy. If P is a generator of G 1 , then e(P, P ) is a generator of G 2 . In other words, e(P, P ) = 1.
Computability. e is efficiently computable.
ID-based Signature
ID-based signature from pairings (IDS) is proposed by Hess in [44] . IDS consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. Setup: The trust authority chooses a random number as a secret key and generates a public key.
Extract: When a signer requests the secret key corresponding to their identity, this algorithm is performed by the trust authority. A secret key of the identity is then given to the signer by the trust authority. Verify: The receiver verifies the received signed message and outputs whether the signature is valid or not.
SYSTEM MODEL AND DATA STRUCTURE
In this section, we present the system model, system components and data structure for our scheme. Our userdifferentiated system model, system components and cube data structure are designed specifically for academic big data.
System Model
The scheme proposed in this paper is based on a three-party cloud data storage and sharing model. Fig. 1 illustrates the user-differentiated system model of the proposed scheme. The model consists of three entities: users, trusted third party (TTP) and cloud server (CS). Three types of users are generally considered: authors, journal editors, and readers. In this model, the authors' and editors' requirements are basically the same. We describe the three entities in the model as follows.
User: In our model, authors, editors and readers are considered the three main scholarly data related personnel types. An author needs to upload his academic achievements, including personal and co-author information, papers, and experimental data and results, to the cloud. An editor may need to upload magazine/journal information, accepted papers and latest spacial issues. Readers need access to the latest paper and journal information. Although the needs of the authors and editors are not the same, their functional requirements are similar. Therefore, in this system, we consider author and editor to be the same object. They need to upload data, verify the integrity of their data and provide corresponding keywords. In addition, we consider that readers need to search for relevant scholarly data with keywords and download the search results with an integrity verification.
Trusted third party (TTP):
TTP is assumed to be a terminal with unlimited computing and storage capability. TTP must complete the user's integrity verification requirements for specified data. Additionally, TTP helps the cloud server authenticate the users and is responsible for processing the keywords sent by users and sending them to the cloud server to achieve searchable encryption of scholarly big data.
Cloud Server (CS): We assume that CS is a terminal with unlimited computing and storage capability. CS responds to the user's storage requests and download requests and realizes identity authentication and secure keyword search with the help of TTP.
System Components
The scheme is composed of two main phases: tag upload and keyword search phase and search result feedback and integrity verification phase. The first phase consists of five algorithms, and the latter one includes three algorithms. The eight algorithms are described individually as follows.
Setup SearchTest(param, V , T w ): This algorithm is run by CS. The system parameters param, V and trapdoor T w are provided to CS as input. CS outputs a set X with all block numbers of the scholarly data that have been searched for by the reader.
Challenge(param, X): Given param and the list X as input, TTP runs this algorithm to output a challenge chal.
ProofGen(param, chal): This algorithm is run by CS. param and the challenge chal are taken as input. CS outputs a proof ε.
ProofTest(param, ε): This algorithm is run by TTP. TTP takes param and the proof ε provided by CS as input and outputs 1 or 0 to indicate whether all the blocks in X are intact.
Cube Data Structure
The cube data structure described here refers to the relationship between the data fragments and their related keywords stored in the cloud. We demonstrate the novel data storage structure for our proposed scheme in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 shows the overall system in a three-dimensional cube structure. Each plane in this cube represents a user and his information. A user may be an author who uploads academic data, an 
SECURITY MODEL
The following three security issues are considered in this paper: security against a malicious CS, security against a curious TTP, security against a forged user and security against other attack types. The possible attack patterns of these kinds of attackers are described as follows.
Malicious CS
A malicious CS can be a CS who wants to modify the uploaded keywords or who wants to know the keywords that the reader searches for. A CS may attempt to modify the user's keywords, which may change the data's capability of being searched for. A malicious CS may guess the user's encryption process and replace the user's key words with fake encrypted key words.
A CS may also want to know its readers' search habits or purposes by collecting information about the keywords that the readers search for. Malicious cloud servers may store keywords that are searched by users. By comparing the encrypted results, the CS may find the keywords that the user is searching for.
Curious TTP
A curious TTP may be interested in the author's and editor's uploaded data or their habits of setting keywords and the keywords that the readers search for.
A TTP may be interested in the data uploaded to the cloud, and may want to view the author's academic achievements without authorization. A TTP may guess what data are uploaded by users through the message files uploaded by the users.
A TTP may also be curious about what keywords are set or searched by users. A TTP may try to determine the encrypted keywords of a user by comparing the encrypted messages one by one with the keywords encrypted by himself.
Forged User
An attacker may forge a user's identity, including forging the author's or editor's identity and faking the identity of the reader.
A forged author/editor may upload false scholarly data, which has an impact on the real author's reputation. The false author may modify the author and journal information of the paper to change the copyright of the paper. a fake author may also use the identity to upload new scholarly results, which may have an impact on the scholarly reputation of the forged identity.
A forged reader may obtain information without authorization, which will damage the interests of the copyright owner. Once scholarly achievements are captured by a forged reader, the attacker may wantonly spread the research results without the permission of the authors and publishers, resulting in serious consequences.
Other Attack Types
We list other important attack types in this subsection, including replay attack, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack and forward security.
Replay attack is a form of network attack where a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. The attacker may intercept part of the information on the channel and try to communicate with another terminal repeatedly.
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack refers to an attack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other.
Forward security is a property of secure communication protocols in which compromises of long-term keys do not compromise past session keys.
OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, our proposed scheme is described in detail. We first present an overview of the novel scheme. Then, the scheme is demonstrated in two phases.
Overview of the scheme
The scheme designed in this paper can meet the user's requirements for data integrity verification and keyword encrypted search. A scenario was set up to better demonstrate the workflow and features of the proposed scheme. A user u (author or editor) sends data to CS with a series of encrypted keywords, and another user u * (reader) searches the data for the keyword W * and asks the system to provide an integrity verification of the data results for which he is searching. Note that this reader may be the author or editor himself or other people who pass the system authentication. In addition, the proposed scheme allows multiple users to upload data. To simplify the scheme described in this section, only one user is designed to upload data for searching. Each user's data are independent in the data structure, as shown in Fig. 2 , so the simplified scheme is an efficient approach. The proposed scheme is divided into two phases: tag upload and keyword search phase and feedback and integrity verification phase, which are illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , respectively.
Tag Upload and Keyword Search Phase
This phase mainly describes the following processes. 1) The author/editor first uploads the academic data to CS. Then, the author/editor generates the corresponding tag and set the encrypted keywords of each data block and sends them to the TTP. 2) The reader encrypts keywords and sends them to the TTP for search and verification results. The tag upload and keyword search phase is illustrated in Fig. 3 , and the detailed steps are listed as follows.
Setup: An additive group G 1 and a multiplicative group G 2 with prime order q are chosen. There exists a bilinear map e on (G 1 ,
q is chosen as the master key, and P pub is set as P pub = αP . Five hash functions are chosen as follows:
len . The system parameters are (G 1 , G 2 , e, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , len). Consider a user (author or editor) u with his identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * . Calculate his private key as s = αH 3 (ID).
TagKeywordGen: The user wants to upload a message M . It is divided into I blocks, represented by m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m i , . . . , m I . A random number λ ∈ R Z * q is chosen and utilized to compute τ = λP . For each data block m i , the user computes
where n∈N ω i/n represents the value obtained after adding all keywords corresponding to the data block. σ i is the tag generated for m i .
The user sets some keywords for each data block. The n-th keyword for i-th block is denoted W i/n . The user generates a random value r ∈ R Z * q and computes R = rP . The user then computes ω i/n = rH 1 W i/n . The message file τ, {σ i } , ω i/n , R, IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n is then sent to the TTP.
SKeywordGen: This algorithm is performed by another user who wants to read some scholarly data in this system, who is called the reader. The reader chooses the keyword W * , which is the target keyword that he wants to know about. The reader generates a random value f ∈ R Z * q and computes F = f P . He calculates ω * = f H 1 (W * ). A message file (ω * , F, IDS(ω * ||F )) is transmitted to the TTP. TrapdoorGen: The TTP verifies the author/editor's identity and the reader's identity. If the reader has the authority to read the related data, TTP computes V = H 2 (e(ω i/n , F )) and let trapdoor T w = ω * . A message file (R, V, τ, T w ) is sent to CS.
SearchTest: When receiving the trapdoor sent by TTP, CS tests whether V = H 2 (e (T w , F )) stands. If true, output yes, else output no. 
Feedback and Integrity Verification Phase
We explain the workflow of the second phase of our proposed scheme as follows: CS sends the data block set back to TTP, and TTP generates the challenge to verify the integrity of these data. CS gives feedback to the challenge, and TTP verifies the data integrity and returns the result to the reader.
Through the preceding operations, CS obtains all data block numbers containing the searched keyword and puts them into a set {x}. Let X = {x} and send it to the TTP. The feedback and integrity verification of the search results is demonstrated in Fig. 4 . Next, we describe the specific interpretation of this phase.
Challenge: All numbers in X consist of a new data sequence. TTP chooses a random number v x ∈ R Z * q for each x in X and another random number ϕ ∈ R Z * q . TTP computes π = ϕP . Then, K x = e(v x H 3 (ID) , P pub ) ϕ is computed with the uploader's ID. TTP then computes
n∈N ω x/n . Finally, CS computes
A message file (ε, τ, IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n ) is then sent to the TTP.
ProofTest: TTP verifies IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n . If the signature is correct, TTP checks if
If the equality holds, TTP considers the data to be complete and informs the reader of the results of this verification.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show the correctness of our scheme. Then, we present the security analysis for the aspects of security against malicious CS, curious TTP and forged user. Additionally, some common security issues are discussed to prove the security of our protocol.
Correctness
The correctness of a scheme is related not only to whether the scheme is feasible but also to the security of the system using this scheme. The correctness of the proposed scheme is tested for two main aspects: the correctness of security keyword search and the correctness of the search results' integrity verification.
Note that W i/n represents the n-th keyword of the i-th data block. Therefore, in this test, we take one keyword W as an example. The correctness of the security keyword search is presented as follows:
The correctness of the search results integrity verification is presented as follows: 
x∈X e (v x σ i , ϕτ ) The correctness of the proposed scheme guarantees that the integrity of the data cannot be verified once the data in the cloud are modified.
Security against a Malicious CS
A malicious CS can be divided into two cases: a CS that wants to modify the keywords and a CS that wants to know the keywords that the reader searches for.
If CS modifies a keyword n of a segment of data x, L = x∈X m x H 4 n∈N ω x/n will be changed. The proof ε provided by CS is then changed due to the change of L. The value IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n in the message file cannot be accepted by TTP. In addition, TTP verifies the ε with the value σ x sent by the user. Even if CS retains the previous IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n , TTP can also know that the ε sent by CS is illegal.
If CS wants to collect keywords from the author/editor, or the keywords that the reader searches for, CS can only collect a set of value {ω i/n } that the user transmits to CS with scholarly data, and V and T w that TTP sends to CS. ω i/n = rH 1 (W i/n ) and V = H 2 (e(ω i/n , F )) are computed using random number r generated by the author/editor.
is computed using random number f generated by the reader. These information is held by the users themselves, so it cannot be acquired by CS.
Security against a Curious TTP
A curious TTP may be interested in the scholarly data or keywords that the users are setting or searching for.
Our scheme achieves perfect data privacy against a curious TTP because the scholarly data are sent directly to the CS by the user. The TTP can only obtain σ i = mi λ H 4 n∈N ω i/n + s , as computed using the uploaded data from the user. λ is a random number generated by the user, and s is the user's secret key.
TTP can also hardly learn about the keywords of the users. Because ω i/n = rH 1 (W i/n ) and ω * = f H 1 (W * ) are computed using the random numbers r and f generated by the users, keywords are opaque to TTP.
Security against a Forged User
If the user's identity is forged by an attacker, the forged user may try to upload incorrect or useless information or search for scholarly data without payment.
A forged author/editor cannot learn about the value α, so the value s = αH 3 (ID) cannot be computed.
A forged reader needs to obtain the real reader's secret key x. However, the secret key cannot be obtained.
Both the forged author and the forged reader cannot sign the message file with their secret key by using IDS.
Resistance to Replay Attack
Replay attack refers to the attacker intercepting a part of the information on the channel and trying to communicate with another terminal. For instance, the adversary intercepts a valid message τ, {σ i } , ω i/n , R, IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n and attempts to start a new session with TTP. In fact, the information of the keywords is sent to CS by the author/editor with the scholarly data. One can hardly intercept both the message on the channel from the user to TTP and the message from the user to CS at the same time. Thus, the proposed scheme can resist replay attacks.
Resistance against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack
Assume that an adversary modifies the transmitted message file τ, {σ i } , ω i/n , R, IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n into τ, {σ i } , ω i/n , R , IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n or modify the message into τ , σ i , ω i/n , R, IDS τ || n∈N ω i/n . The adversary can hardly know ℵ and λ, so it cannot compute an acceptable ω or σ.
Keyword Setting with Forward Secrecy
The keyword setting process in our scheme provides forward secrecy. An attacker cannot utilize an old IDS message to upload new keywords. The reason is that the random number r changes every round and the IDS message is generated with the old keywords.
To summarize, our proposed scheme can resist malicious CS, curious TTP, forged user, replay attack and MITM attack, and it is secure for use with scholarly big data.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed protocol. Table. 1 demonstrates the computational cost of each part in the proposed scheme. The scheme is considered to be composed of two phases: tag upload and keyword search phase and feedback and integrity verification phase. The symbols M, H, H p , P and E are utilized to denote the costs of scalar multiplication, collision-resistant hash function, mapto-point hash operation, bilinear pairing and exponentiation, respectively. Additionally, we use IDS-S and IDS-V to represent the signature and verification processes of IDS. Note that the x in the table represents the number of file blocks being determined. We can see that the author/editor only costs 1 scalar multiplication, 2 hash to point operations and one IDS signature operation. The reader only costs 2 scalar multiplications, 1 map-to-point hash operation, 1 collision-resistant hash function and one IDS signature operation to search a keyword. In the first phase, TTP costs 1 collision-resistant hash function, 1 bilinear pairing and 2 IDS verification operations. CS costs 1 hash function and 1 bilinear pairing. For the second phase, CS costs x scalar multiplications, 1 hash operation, 1 hash to point, 1 bilinear pairing, 2 exponentiations and 1 IDS signature operation, and TTP costs 2(1+x) scalar multiplications, 1 hash function, 1 hash to point operation, (1+x) bilinear pairing operations, x exponentiations and 1 IDS verification.
The efficiency of the proposed scheme is simulated using a GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library and a Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library 1 . C language is used on a Linux system with the Ubuntu 16.04 TLS, a 2.60 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 v2, and 8 GB of RAM. The results are shown in Fig. 5 . The time consumption of users, both author/editor and reader, is lower than 50 ms in our simulation for any number of data blocks that have been found in the cloud for a specific keyword. A large number of computations is undertaken by TTP and CS. The computational capability of these is infinite in our model. Therefore, our protocol is an efficient searchable and verifiable data protection protocol for scholarly big data.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct a system model that can distinguish the users according to their roles and special requirements of scholarly big data. Moreover, an innovative cube data storage structure is proposed. On the basis of the novel system and data structure, we present a novel searchable and verifiable data protection scheme for scholarly big data. The security and performance analyses show that our scheme is efficient for scholarly big data. In the future, we will design a secure data sharing scheme for scholarly big data to supplement our current scheme. 
